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PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- SEARCH AND SEIZURE - RIGHT
TO PRIVACY- INDIVIDUAL BANKING RECORDS. The Pennsylvania

Supreme Court has held that the Pennsylvania Constitution protects
an individual bank depositor's records from unauthorized police subpoenas when no legal proceedings have been instituted against the individual.
Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979)
Jill DeJohn, an Allegheny County housewife, was convicted in the
Court of Common Pleas on counts of attempted theft by extortion and
murder of the third degree in the death of her husband.1 The victim,
Michael DeJohn, was found dead in the garage of the couple's Ross
Township home. Death was caused by a single gunshot wound to the
back of his head.! During the investigation of the shooting, the police
acquired information from a victim of an alleged blackmail attempt
which implicated Mrs. DeJohn as the author of an anonymous typewritten extortion letter.8 Evidence of financial distress uncovered during the investigation of Mrs. DeJohn's involvement in the abortive
extortion attempt' led the police to suspect that Mrs. DeJohn had
murdered her husband. The police then obtained two subpoenas from
the District Attorney's office5 directing the DeJohns' bank to submit
copies of all bank account transactions and loan applications made by
either or both of the DeJohns. The bank complied with the order and
turned over the DeJohns' bank records to the police. At the time of
the issuance and use of the subpoenas, Mrs. DeJohn was not under indictment for either the attempted extortion or for the death of her
husband, nor did she consent to the search. Further, there had been no
judicial authorization to investigate Mrs. DeJohn.'
1. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1284 (Pa. 1979). Mrs. DeJohn was acquitted on a forgery charge in a nonjury proceeding.
2. Id. Mrs. DeJohn testified that the only items found missing were a small amount
of money and a .25 caliber automatic pistol, which was kept in the drawer of an adjacent
gameroom. Michael DeJohn's watch, ring, and wallet were found undisturbed on his person. The wallet contained $46 in cash and several credit cards. ILL
3. Id. at 1285. Mrs. DeJohn admitted at trial that she had composed an extortion
note demanding $5,000, addressed to a neighbor of the DeJohns. Id.
4. Id. at 1293. The extortion note was received by the intended victim a few days
before Mrs. DeJohn's death. Id
5. Id. at 1287. The subpoenas were signed by the clerk of courts. It was also noted
by the court that failure to comply with such a subpoena could have subjected the bank
and its officials to fines or imprisonment. Id.
6. Id. The court observed that police subpoenas had been common investigative
tools for the discovery of evidence held by third parties, and had frequently been served
on banks by the police and other government units without judicial sanction. Id.
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Information obtained from one of the subpoenaed checks documented Mrs. DeJohn's purchase of the typewriter used to type the extortion note,7 and the introduction of this evidence was instrumental in
securing Mrs. DeJohn's extortion conviction.8 Other evidence taken
from the bank records reinforced the general impression that the
DeJohns were deeply in debt. The bank records showed that Mrs.
DeJohn, as manager of the family finances, had resorted to illegal
methods to conceal the full extent of their insolvency from her husband. For example, she had forged his signature on a bank loan application rather than reveal their true financial plight to him.' Her
forgery and extortion efforts, together with her status as the beneficiary of her husband's substantial life insurance policy,0 apparently
established to the satisfaction of the jury that Mrs. DeJohn had a
strong financial motive for murder." The trial court denied her motion
to suppress the use of the bank records as evidence in the murder trial
after finding that the seizure of the records did not violate her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 2
On appeal, 8 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court" reversed the murder
conviction, 5 ruling that the bank statements had been illegally seized
7. Id at 1292.
8. Id. at 1291-92. The check itself was not introduced at the extortion trial, but evidence that it had been used to purchase the typewriter was interjected during an exchange between the prosecutor and a witness. Moreover, Mrs. DeJohn admitted purchasing the typewriter with the check that had been seized pursuant to the invalid subpoena.
Although she admitted to typing the extortion note, she contended that she later abandoned the scheme. Id.
9. The DeJohns had debts of approximately $10,000 in addition to a house mortgage
on which they were late in making their installment payments. Id. at 1285.
10. Id. Mrs. DeJohn had been named as the primary beneficiary of her husband's
$201,000 life insurance policy. Id.
11. Id. at 1286.
12. Id. at 1287.
13. The supreme court heard the murder conviction on direct appeal. The extortion
conviction was appealed to the superior court, which certified the appeal to the supreme
court. Id. at 1284 & n.1.
14. Justice O'Brien authored the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Eagen
and Justice Nix. Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion. Justice Larsen concurred in
the affirmation of the extortion conviction and dissented in the reversal of the third
degree murder sentence. Justice Manderino dissented from the plurality's affirmation of
the extortion conviction, and from their remand for a new trial on the murder charge, as
he found no evidence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. DeJohn had murdered
her husband. Justice Pomeroy took no part in the decision.
15. 403 A.2d at 1292. The plurality opinion found that the circumstantial evidence
would have been sufficient to sustain the murder conviction if not for the tainted source
of that evidence. Id. at 1286. Justice O'Brien reasoned that the immediate circumstances
of Mr. DeJohn's death supported a probable inference of appellant's culpability. She was
the only adult known to have been at the DeJohn home when the victim was shot and
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in violation of Mrs. DeJohn's state constitutional rights, and that a new
trial was therefore required."0 However, the court did not disturb the
extortion conviction since the illegally taken records were only indirectly introduced at the extortion proceedings." Justice O'Brien
spoke for a majority of the court18 in deciding whether the non-judicially authorized seizure of bank records violates an individual bank
depositor's right to be free of unreasonable violations of his privacy
rights. Justice O'Brien based his affirmative conclusion on the guarantee against unreasonable searches contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution. ' Even though the language of the state constitutional provision is almost identical to that of the fourth amendment" to the
Federal Constitution, the DeJohn court refused to follow the United
States Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the subject in United
States v. Miller,"' where, in a similar factual situation, the confidentiality of bank records was denied. Justice O'Brien strongly opposed the
Miller Court's sanction of an informal police subpoena as a valid mode
of investigation as long as no direct intrusion into the suspect's private
sphere of personally held possessions was involved.' Instead, the
there was no evidence of forced entry to corroborate Mrs. DeJohn's explanation that an
armed burglar had shot her husband. Id. The court further observed that Mrs. DeJohn
knew how to use a gun, and that Mr. DeJohn's experience in the Army as a "Green
Beret" belied the possibility that a stranger could get within pointblank range to shoot
him. Id at 1285.
16. Id. at 1292.
17. Id See note 8 supra.
18. Although only Chief Justice Eagen and Justice Nix joined in Justice O'Brien's
opinion, a majority of the court found that the unauthorized seizure of Mrs. DeJohn's
bank records violated her state constitutional rights because Justice Manderino, in his
dissenting opinion, agreed with the plurality on this point. 403 A.2d at 1307 (Manderino,
J., dissenting).
19. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
20. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (police subpoena of bank records of suspected bootlegger prior
to indictment does not violate fourth amendment privacy rights).
22. 403 A.2d at 1289.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 18:363

Pennsylvania court cited its earlier decision in Commonwealth v.
Polak' for the proposition that subpoenas directed to a third party are
properly used to investigate individuals only if legal proceedings have
already been instituted against them."' The DeJohn court extended
Polak to bar the use of an informal police subpoena to obtain evidence
which is divulged to third parties involved in the banking transactions
of an unindicted suspect.'
In reaching this conclusion, the DeJohn court refused to accept the
Miller Court's declaration that the personal nature of federal fourth
amendment rights protects the individual against an unauthorized
seizure of his papers only if the papers are directly owned or legitimately held by him.' In defining the commonwealth's constitutional
guarantees against illegal searches and seizures, the court reiterated
23. 438 Pa. 67, 263 A.2d 354 (1970). Polak held that police seizure of allegedly pornographic films from their owner, an adult bookstore proprietor, prior to his indictment
violated the provision of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2079 (Purdon 1962), which required that
a matter involving the suspect be before the court prior to the issuance of a court subpoena directed to a third party. 438 Pa. at 69, 263 A.2d at 355.
24. 403 A.2d at 1287.
25. Id. at 1291.
26. Id at 1289-90. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-42 (1976), where the
Court held that a bank depositor lacked standing to challenge a nonjudicially sanctioned
subpoena due to the depositor's lack of proprietary or possessory interest in the seized
bank records, which in the federal court's analysis, belonged solely to the bank. Miller is
based on the view that an individual bank depositor is a participant in a wholly commercial transaction that is amenable to government surveillance. See Pray, A Bank Customer
Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy of Bank Records: United States v. Miller, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 414 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Pray]; Alexander & Spurgeon, Privacy,
Banking Records and the Supreme Court. A Before and After Look at Miller, 10 Sw. U.L.
REv. 13 (1978). Since the privacy rights covered by the federal fourth amendment are
easily defined in terms of individual ownership or possession, a proprietary-oriented
analysis has generally controlled the federal court's disposition of search and seizure cases
in situations in which items concerning one individual were taken from a third party without judicial warrant. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The federal courts
have taken the position that uncoerced disclosure of information to third parties satisfies
the Katz criteria that a voluntary and conscious exposure by individuals of their possessions to others waives any reasonable expectation that the entrusted third parties will
respect their privacy. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969).
These cases involved challenges by taxpayers to Internal Revenue Service administrative
subpoenas of their bank records, which were used to determine taxable income. They
were decided against the taxpayers on the grounds that 1) the subpoenaed records, usually microfilmed checks and account deposit and withdrawal schedules, had been compiled
by the bank to verify customer balances and thus were business records owned by the
bank rather than by the depositors; and 2) the relationship between the bank and its customers was that of debtor and creditor. Therefore, the depositor has no privilege of confidentiality for his communications with his bank.
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its recent holding in Commonwealth v. White.' In White, the court
held that the individual's effects and possessions as well as his person
are protected from unreasonable search and seizure. From that principle, it followed that the constitutional protection is not dependent upon
the physical presence or physical absence of the individual owner, but
rather, depends upon whether or not the individual's expectation of
freedom from intrusion is reasonable.28
In addition to its reliance upon prior Pennsylvania cases," the
DeJohn court followed the holding of a California decision, Burrows v.
Superior Court,"' in which a bank depositor successfully challenged a
police subpoena similar to that used in DeJohn to obtain evidence for
criminal prosecution. Justice O'Brien placed particular emphasis on the
reasoning of Burrows that modern financial management necessitates
widespread use of banking facilities."' The DeJohn court adopted the
Burrows distinction between the depositor's limited waiver of his privacy rights to permit the individual processing of his checks by his
bank, and the legitimate expectations of privacy he retains against
third party scrutiny of his bank records in their totality.' The court
noted that such an expectation of privacy is reasonable since bank
statements can reveal an intimate biographical profile of the depositor's
lifestyle by disclosing his debtors, creditors, and charitable concerns.'
Moreover, the DeJohn majority rejected the commonwealth's contention that Burrows was inapplicable because the California Constitution contained an explicit guarantee of personal privacy, a feature
which the Pennsylvania Constitution lacked.' The absence of an explicit provision was not deemed controlling by Justice O'Brien, since in
27. 459 Pa. 84, 327 A.2d 40 (1974). cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975). See notes 60 & 62
and accompanying text infra.
28. 459 Pa. at 89-90, 327 A.2d at 42.
29. See Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974); Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 239 A.2d 290 (1968). See also notes
61 & 62 and accompanying text infra.
30. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
31. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1289-90.
32. Id. at 1290-91. See also Pray, supra note 26, at 425, cited by the DeJohn court for
the proposition that the brief exposure of an individual's checks to bank personnel for
negotiation does not permit a broad scrutiny of the individual's financial condition. 403
A.2d at 1290-91.
33. 403 A.2d at 1289-90 (citing Burrows, 13 Cal. 3d at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 169).
34. 403 A.2d at 1283. Compare PA. CONST. art. I,§ 8, quoted at note 21 supra with
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1, which provides: "All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." (emphasis added).
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Commonwealth v. Platou," the state supreme court had held that the
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure contained in the
state constitution is premised upon the implicit right to privacy in
Pennsylvania." The DeJohn court also relied upon the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,7 in which Justice
Douglas elaborated his penumbra theory of constitutional interpretation, which declared that the Federal Bill of Rights should be broadly
construed so as to increase the scope of protection of individual rights
as necessary.' Thus, the rationale of the California court in Burrows v.
Superior Court was found to be applicable to the DeJohn controversy. 9
Justice O'Brien further observed that the Burrows decision, in
recognizing modern electronic realities, was more persuasive than the
simplistic proprietary analysis rejected in Katz v. United States,0
which held that an individual's reasonable expection of privacy is protected by the federal constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
search and seizure." He noted that the United States v. Miller decision
marked a return to the arbitrary criteria which Katz had opposed, in
that the Miller Court resurrected the proprietary analysis to deny the
individual standing to assert a violation of constitutional rights.'2
The court concluded that because Miller establishes a dangerous
precedent, it should not be followed when construing the state constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures.' 3 The
court found that Miller could be ignored by state courts when interpreting their own constitutions, since under settled principles of
federal constitutional law, a state may impose standards on searches
35. 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). See note 56
infra.
36. 403 A.2d at 1291.
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy of communications between woman and family planning advisor upheld).
38. Id. at 483-84.
39. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1291.
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the police had monitored a telephone call made by a
bookie from a public telephone booth. The surveillance was accomplished by attaching an
electronic listening device to the outside of the telephone booth. The Court held that this
practice violated the bookie's fourth amendment rights, since he was entitled to his
reasonable expectation of privacy in the monitored activity. Katz overruled the "trespass
doctrine" which had first been expressed in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
and had later been reaffirmed in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Under the
Olmstead doctrine a direct physical intrusion into property either owned or legitimately
possessed by the individual was a prerequisite for claiming federal constitutional protection against illegal search and seizure. 389 U.S. at 352-53.
41. 403 A.2d at 1290.
42. See id. In Miller, the court held that the bank held proprietary interests since it
had prepared the records. 425 U.S. at 440-41.
43. 403 A.2d at 1289.
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and seizures higher than those required by the federal constitution."
Justice Roberts concurred in the majority result, but did not find it
necessary to use state constitutional grounds to determine if the bank
records should have been admitted into evidence.' 5 However, since the
court had reached the state constitutional question, Justice Roberts
took the opportunity to postulate that the relationship between a bank
and its customers was "something less than a constitutional right of
privacy and something more than a confidential relationship."' 6 Therefore, he favored a role which would accommodate all competing interests by making bank records available upon compliance with proper
legal process.'7
Justice Larsen, dissenting from the majority view, agreed with the
Miller decision that the wholly commercial nature of the bank-customer relationship prevented the depositor from challenging informal
government access to his bank records.'8 Moreover, Justice Larsen objected to the court's absolute application of the exclusionary rule for
the illegally seized evidence."' The dissenter claimed that a selective
applications' of the exclusionary rule should have been utilized since
Mrs. DeJohn was not materially harmed by the seizure of her bank
records, and no direct invasion of her home or personally-held effects
was involved. 1 In contrast, Justice Manderino joined that portion of
the court's opinion holding that the bank records were inadmissible as
evidence in the murder trial due to their illegal seizure. 2 However, he
insisted that the extortion indictment should also have been reversed
and remanded for a new trial. In his view, the court's distinction between the direct use of the tainted evidence at the murder trial, and
44. Id. at 1288. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
45. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1293 (Roberts, J., concurring). In Justice
Robert's view, the evidence was insufficient to sustain a third degree murder conviction.
Since a majority of the court did not agree with this view, he further contended that a
new trial was warranted because evidence of Mrs. DeJohn's prior criminal conduct had
been admitted improperly. Id at 1292.
46. Id. at 1293 (Roberts, J., concurring).
47. Id. Despite his concern for effective law enforcement, Justice Roberts did not
specify how his view differed from that of the majority, since under the majority view,
bank records could presumably be taken pursuant to a valid subpoena.
48. Id. at 1293-94 (Larsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Id. The use of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the violation of federal constitutional rights first occurred in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
50. 403 A.2d at 1299-1300 (Larsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Larsen used the selective application model contained in the ALI MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS290.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
51. 403 A.2d at 1301 (Larsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Id. at 1307 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
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the indirect use of the bank records in the extortion trial,' was an
irrelevant qualification."'
The DeJohn court's declaration that an individual bank depositor's
statements are secure from informal government inspection is a
natural corollary to recent Pennsylvania decisions which drew heavily
upon the Katz notions of individual privacy rights.' The prior decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Platou,'
Commonwealth v. White," and Commonwealth v. Treftz" established
the state's adoption of the Katz standard that an individual's constitutionally protected interests are defined by the reasonableness of his
expectations of privacy in his social and business dealings, rather than
by the extent of his proprietary or possessory claims on the confiscated items or information. In Commonwealth v. Platou, one of the
first Pennsylvania cases dealing with unreasonable searches after
Katz, the state supreme court declared that the police had violated the
privacy rights of an individual whose suitcase was discovered and
opened during a legitimate search of his friend's apartment."9 The
53. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
54. 403 A.2d at 1307 (Manderino, J., dissenting). According to Justice Manderino, it
was immaterial that the typewriter check itself was not introduced into evidence, since
the total contents of the check were read into evidence.
55. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
56. 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). The Platou court
cited its previous decision in Commonwealth v. Storck, 442 Pa. 197, 275 A.2d 362 (1971), in
which the court ruled that one person cannot waive the rights of another to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure. Thus, the Platou court held that the consent of the
owner of the premises to the search of his absent friend's suitcase did not mitigate the
violation of the appellant's rights. 455 Pa. at 262-63, 312 A.2d at 32. The court emphasized
that the officer executing the search warrant had no authority to exceed its scope, which
was limited to the seizure of the apartment owner's effects. There was neither probable
cause nor prior legal authorization to search the appellant's suitcase stored on the premises. Id. 312 A.2d at 32-33.
57. 459 Pa. 84, 327 A.2d 40 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975). The White court
cited Platou for the proposition that the protection of an individual's effects from
unreasonable search or seizure does not depend upon his physical presence or absence
from the place where they are taken, provided that the articles are stored in a reasonably
discreet fashion. Id. at 89-90, 327 A.2d at 42-43.
58. 465 Pa. 614, 351 A.2d 265, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976). Treftz held that the
privacy rights of the appellant, an occasional visitor to the home of the murder victim,
were not violated by the search of the victim's home without prior judicial approval. Id at
623, 351 A.2d at 269. The key factors in the ruling were the appellant's infrequent contacts with the premises, and his lack of a possessory interest in either the corpse or in
any of the other evidence seized at the victim's home which implicated the appellant in
the slaying. Id. at 622, 351 A.2d at 268-69. Treftz reiterated the Platou rule that the appellant's lack of legal title to the searched premises was an irrelevant consideration in determining the extent of his privacy rights in the searched premises. Id at 623, 351 A.2d at
269.
59. 455 Pa. at 267, 312 A.2d at 34.
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court conditioned its recognition of the appellant's claims to his marijuana-filled suitcase on the absence of any meaningful renunciation of
control over it on his part. The latter fact was evidenced to the court's
satisfaction by the placement of the suitcase beyond easy visibility in
the apartment. The appellant's lack of a protected interest in the
premises was deemed irrelevant to the determination of whether an
illegal search had occurred." Again, in Commonwealth v. White, the
state supreme court cited a violation of both federal and state constitutional safeguards against unwarranted invasions of privacy, notwithstanding the appellant's lack of legal title to the apartment from which
his clothing was seized by police investigating his involvement in a recent crime."1 The court found that neither the suspect's absence at the
time of the search, nor the owner's consent to the intrusion were relevant considerations in determining if the accused's rights had been
violated. Rather, the question was whether the accused had reasonably
expected that his personal effects would not be subject to informal
scrutiny by third parties without his acquiescence."2 Most recently, in
Commonwealth v. Treftz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted
criteria for determining the validity of privacy expectations." These
guidelines require an evaluation of the extent of the individual's control over the articles seized or premises searched and the frequency
with which that control is exercised.
Although the DeJohn court did not expressly apply these earlier
adopted guidelines, the facts of the DeJohn case conform reasonably
well to the Treftz standards. If the bank is viewed as an indispensible
medium for the transaction of one's financial affairs," then a depositor
has not "voluntarily" relinquished his control over the transferred information, for he has no other choice. The bank customer, like the individuals in Platou' and Treftz," retained the right of access to the
items seized from third parties without judicial authorization. Similarly, Mrs. DeJohn's frequent use of the banking facilities demonstrate
that she retained control over the accounts which had generated the
seized items.
Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that both the state
and federal constitutional safeguards against unreasonable search do
60. Id. at 262-63, 312 A.2d at 31-32. See also note 58 supra.
61. 459 Pa. at 89-90, 327 A.2d at 42-43.
62. Id. at 88-89, 327 A.2d at 42.
63. 465 Pa. at 621-22, 351 A.2d at 268-69. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223
(1973), in which the Court made the individual's access to and control over the seized
items the criteria for determining the reasonableness of his privacy expectations.
64. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
66. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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not depend upon a direct seizure from the individual or from his premises, 7 the DeJohn court possessed a strong basis upon which to reject
the restrictive fourth amendment analysis propounded in United
States v. Miller." Although earlier Pennsylvania cases had been based
on privacy rights deemed present in both the federal and the state constitutions, 9 DeJohn marks the first time the court has based its decision solely upon state constitutional provisions against unwarranted
intrusions into an individual's affairs." It is significant that the DeJohn
court also deviated from former Pennsylvania precedent by eliminating
the necessity for an individual to have even a possessory interest in
the confiscated articles. The prior rulings upheld the privacy expectations of the individual in items over which his legal or possessory claim
was clear, however weak may have been his proprietary interests in
the premises from which the articles were taken."'
However, while expanding the concept of constitutionally protected
interests, the DeJohn court ignored the issue of whether it is the bank
or the depositor who holds legal title to the bank's records of the business transactions. The court's silence in this matter indicates that legal
title is not a prerequisite for claiming constitutional protection against
the unauthorized seizure of items or information transferred to a third
party. Instead, the DeJohn court utilized an alternative justification
for establishing an individual's privacy rights in articles outside his
direct control; that security in the transfer of such information is mandated by practical necessity within a business setting.7" This new criterion recognizes an individual's interests in articles, such as bank
records, to which he has only a right of access without legal title or
right of continuous possession. Thus, the major effect of the decision is
its expansion of the scope of constitutionally protected privacy interests. It must also be noted that DeJohn recognized the depositor's
right of privacy without recognizing a confidential relationship between the customer and the bank.7" This suggests that the court did
not want to grant absolute immunity against intrusion into banking
67. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
68. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Commonwealth v. Treftz, 465 Pa. at 621, 351 A.2d at 268; Commonwealth v.
Platou, 455 Pa. at 260, 312 A.2d at 31; Commonwealth v. White, 459 Pa. at 89-90, 327 A.2d
at 42-43.
70. For discussion of the doctrine of adequate state grounds, see P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN,

D.

SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-89 (2d ed. 1973).
71. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra. For example, the appellant in Platou
had no proprietary interest in his friend's searched apartment. See note 56 supra.
72. 403 A.2d at 1289. See text accompanying notes 29-30.
73. 403 A.2d at 1291.
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transactions, since to do so would jeopardize the state's authority to
monitor banking practices. 7' The state court protected the transfer of
information to the bank entirely on the basis of the practical compulsion of normal business practices which require the depositor to provide information identifying his creditors and debtors on his checks
and loan applications. Thus, the federal view that in the absence of a
legally recognized relationship, an individual chooses his confidants at
his own risk,75 was implicitly rejected by DeJohn. The DeJohn court
declined to create such a legally protected bank-depositor relationship,
choosing instead to extend privacy guarantees only to the information
transmitted within that association.
Further clarification of the theoretical underpinnings of this latest
extension of privacy rights will be required, since the DeJohn decision
raises questions concerning the limitations of an individual's privacy interests. For example, it is not clear whether an individual must assert
either an ownership claim or a privileged communication in order to
contest the seizure of evidence transferred to a third party. For this
reason, it is uncertain to what extent the "necessary communication"
concept will serve as a guideline for the implementation of the Katz
standard of reasonable privacy expectations, which Pennsylvania has
adopted as the standard for freedom from unwarranted intrusion.
Although the DeJohn court applied the "necessary communication"
concept to protect information transferred under a clear practical mandate, no guidelines were given to determine if "necessity" is to be
determined by an objective or a subjective standard. Therefore, the
outer limits of this new standard will have to be refined in future litigation. Finally, the court's ambivalent formula, which recognizes a
bank customer's privacy rights while conceding that banking practices
are subject to government surveillance,77 raises questions concerning
the proper balance between competing state and individual interests
on this new fulcrum of necessity."
The most significant aspect of DeJohn is the court's willingness to
construct a theory of state constitutional autonomy by drawing upon
the rationale of selected federal precedents. 9 The DeJohn opinion
marks a significant split between the federal and Pennsylvania courts
on how individual rights are to be balanced with legitimate govern-

74. Id See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
75. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966).
76. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
77. 403 A.2d at 1291.
78. Id. at 1293. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
79. See notes 37 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
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mental interests." By setting higher standards for search and seizure
than the Federal Constitution requires, the DeJohn decision limits the
scope of unreviewed government surveillance of information conveyed
by individuals under practical necessity to third parties within a business context. It remains to be seen how this expanded definition of individual privacy rights will affect the state's power to regulate commerce in general and banking practices in particular, since DeJohn
gives no guidelines for determining what communications are "necessary," and, therefore, constitutionally protected.
Jane E. L. Miller
80. In contrast to the federal court's restrictive interpretation of the fourth amendment rights of bank depositors, other state courts have advanced theories similar to those
used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in DeJohn to uphold the privacy of a bank customer's accounts. The North Carolina, Idaho, and Florida state courts have stressed the
contractual nature of the bank/depositor relationship by stating that the customer's expectations of privacy warrant the inference of a contractual term prohibiting third party
disclosure by the bank without the depositor's consent. See Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank,
224 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578,
367 P.2d 284 (1961); Sparks v. Union Trust Co., 256 N.C. 478, 124 S.E.2d 365 (1962). Like
the DeJohn court, the courts in these cases held that an individual depositor's banking
transactions have a private and a commercial dimension, in contrast to the strictly commercial perspective taken by the federal courts. See also Merritt, Banks and Banking:
FloridaAdopts a Duty of Secrecy, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 482 (1970).

